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LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A

CRITIQUE
The widespread adoption of limited liability company
("LLC") statutes has been a much-heralded development in corporate law.1 At least forty-seven states have passed such statutes2 and the remaining states are considering proposals for the
passage of LLC legislation.3 Because the LLC can provide investors with limited liability,4 pass-through taxation,5 and far more
organizational flexibility than a limited partnership or a corporation organized under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code ("S-corporation"),6 some commentators have suggested that
it is destined to become the business organizational form of the

1

See, e.g., Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company:A Study of

the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375, 380 (1992) ("LLC, which combines the tax
advantages of a partnership with limited liability for all members, offers significant
advantages over other pass-through entities such as the general partnership, limited partnership, or S corporation."); Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulationof Limited
Liability and the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 475 (1992)
("[D]evelopment and tax recognition of LLCs promises to change the law of business
associations radically."); Scott Kapusta & Brian Nichols, Note, Limited Liability
Companies:The OptimalBusiness Organizationfor the Twenty-First Century? 9 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COIMENT. 803, 803 (1994) (stating that "limited liability company
... is one of the most significant recent developments relating to business organizations")..
2 Susan Pace Hamill, Statement of Susan Pace Hamill on the Need for and the
Benefits of the S Corporation Reform Act of 1995, FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING
HOUSE, June 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File. The only
states without LLC statutes are Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Vermont. Id.
SId.
' See infra note 32 and accompanying text (describing limited liability in an
LLC).
See infra note 33 and accompanying text (describing taxation of LLCs). The
model for flow-through taxation is the partnership. A partnership is not taxed as an
entity. Rather, income of the partnership is attributed to the partners, who are
taxed as individuals on that income. See I.R.C. § 701 (West 1988).
6 See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text (explaining that S-corporations
allow for both limited liability and pass-through taxation but are subject to more
restrictions than LLCs).
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future. According to one estimate, 50,000 LLCs have already
been formed.8
A brief comparison of the new form with more traditional
business forms demonstrates why the LLC is such an attractive
investment vehicle. In the past, investors who wanted to participate in management and qualify for pass-through taxation
were largely restricted to the partnership form, an option subjecting partners to personal liability for the obligations of the
partnership.9
Now, however, investors have the additional
choice of the LLC, which has the benefit of providing members
with a means of limiting their liability to the amount of their investment.' ° Similarly, investors who might have chosen to invest
in limited partnerships to qualify for both pass-through taxation
and limited liability, can now organize as an LLC. Whereas
limited partners could lose their limited liability if they participated in the control of the entity," members of an LLC are permitted to exercise management control."
While the new form may be a boon to investors, its impact
on society as a whole is less clear. LLC legislation effectively reduces federal corporate tax rates by allowing more business entities to achieve the benefits of corporate status (such as limited
liability) without paying entity level taxation. 3 This reduction
' See, e.g., Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability
Company, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 391 (1991) ("[Tlhe federal income tax advantages of the LLC, coupled with limited liability for all participants, may render
the LLC the most desirable tax conduit entity."); Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at
408 ("In sum, LLCs ultimately may replace other forms of closely held limited liability business entities including limited partnerships and close corporations. Indeed,
it is even conceivable that LLCs will replace general partnerships for most purposes."); Ribstein, supra note 1, at 427 ("Most firms that now organize as general
partnerships probably will not continue to do so once restrictions on limited liability
have been loosened through recognition of the LLC form."); Jeff Barge, Firms Look
To Convert to Entity Limiting Risk, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS., Oct. 24, 1994, at 16 ("[W]hen
it comes to the formation of new companies, the LLC seems poised to replace older
and less flexible forms such as limited partnerships and Subchapter S corporations.").
8 CPAs Told: LLPs No Panaceafor Liability Problem, ACCT. TODAY, July 10,
1995, at 13.
9UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT [hereinafter U.P.A.] § 15 (1914).
'0 See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
" REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT [hereinafter R.U.L.P.A.] § 303 (1976)
(amended 1985).
12 See infra note 58 and accompanying
text.
"3See Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Treatment of Limited Liability Companies: Law
in Search of Policy, 50 BUS. LAW. 995 (1995) ("[Tlax treatment of LLCs has broad
implications for the federal revenue. To the extent a business can be conducted
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was achieved without the benefit of a national debate that would
federal legislation to accomplish the same
have accompanied
4
purpose.1

Furthermore, as partnerships convert to limited liability
companies, and as new businesses organize in the LLC form, the
number of investors protected by the shield of limited liability,
through an LLC ... instead of through a corporation, an entire level of tax can be
avoided."); Tony Kontzer, Law Gives Some Small State Firms a Tax Break, BUS. J.,
Oct. 10, 1994, at 3 ("corporations converting to LLC status could reduce their state
and federal income taxes by one-third"); see also GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM BILL MEMO
# 234, GOVERNOR'S BILL JACKET 1994 CHAPTER 576, New York Legislative Service,
at 11 [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM BILL] ("LLCs will be an attractive alternative to corporations. The advent of LLCs in New York, then, is expected to alter
significantly the landscape of the State business taxes, with a migration from the
corporate to the partnership model.").
Corporations are taxed as entities on their net income. I.R.C. § 11 (West 1995).
In addition, shareholders are then taxed on corporate dividends. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7)
(West 1995). This structure is often referred to as "double taxation." LLCs, which
can qualify for pass-through taxation, allow investors to avoid taxation at the entity
level. Furthermore, unlike corporate losses, LLC losses can flow through to the investor and can be used to offset other income. See I.R.C. § 702 (West 1995)
(describing treatment of partnership gains and losses).
Some commentators have suggested that the loss of revenue to the state will not
be significant because existing corporations will not convert to LLCs because of the
tax consequences accompanying conversion. See, e.g., Carol J. Miller & Radie Bunn,
Limited Liability Company: Best of Both Worlds, NAT'L PUB. ACCT., Feb. 1995, at 36
(discussing consequences of conversion). There are several flaws in this argument. It
is true that in order to fully convert to a LLC, a corporation must undergo a liquidation and at this time, both the corporation and the shareholders may be taxed.
Sidney Kess, An Update on Limited Liability Companies, N.Y. L.J., June 5, 1995, at
3. The tax bite will be felt if the corporation's stock or assets have appreciated.
CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX
AND BUSINESS LAW 1 12.06[1], at 12-19 (1994). However, if a corporation has tax
losses, there may be no tax owed upon conversion. Id. This suggests that businesses
in the first few years of operation may convert from corporate to LLC form. Secondly, liquidation of corporate subsidiaries is not a taxable event. Id. 1 12.06[2], at
12-20 n.97. Thus subsidiaries will convert from corporations to LLCs, enabling the
parent corporation to eliminate taxation at the entity (subsidiary) level while still
isolating itself from the liabilities of the subsidiary. Thirdly, shareholders of corporations whose assets have appreciated might still find conversion worthwhile as the
tax savings over time may exceed the tax cost of conversion. Finally, there are ways
for corporations to convert to LLCs without immediately liquidating, such as selling
corporate assets to a parallel LLC or forming a joint venture with an LLC. Id. 1
12.06, at 12-19 to 12-34.
Of course, new businesses, including subsidiaries, may initially be organized as
LLCs rather than corporations, thereby reducing tax revenues without any conversion issues.
"4For a discussion of why the Internal Revenue Service allowed limited liability
companies to be taxed as a partnerships, see infra notes 65-68 and accompanying
text; cf. Goldberg, supra note 13, at 997 ("[G]rowth of LLCs poses a very important
policy issue for the federal income tax system.").
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will grow. Is a widespread expansion of limited liability desirable? Corporate limited liability allows enterprises to externalize some of their costs. 5 It also creates an incentive for corporations to engage in risky behavior, knowing that although the full
benefit of any success will accrue to shareholders, the cost of
failure or injury can be spread among shareholders (whose loss is
limited to their initial investment), creditors (whose loss is limited to the amount of credit extended),"8 and those injured by the
acts of the corporation (whose loss is potentially unlimited). 7
Thus, limited liability is at odds with modern tort law which requires that enterprises "pay their own way." 8 Yet certain policy
justifications have been advanced for allowing corporate shareholders to limit their liability. 9 Do these policies support limited
liability for members of limited liability companies?
In their hurry to pass LLC legislation, 0 and faced with pres-

15

See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and CorporateGroups, 11 J. CORP.

L. 573, 576 (1986); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1879 (1991)
(providing example of corporate externalization of costs in context of limited liability
in tort); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious
Liability of CorporateParticipantsfor Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1
(1994). But see Ribstein, supra note 1, at 439 (arguing that "potential for externalities may be less than has been supposed").
16 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 90 (1985) (observing that lenders also have limited
liability). It seems that only "involuntary creditors" such as tort victims have true
unlimited liability.
'7 Id. at 104 (noting that "shareholders of a firm reap all of the benefits of risky
activities but do not bear all of the costs").
18 See id.; Thompson, supra note 15, at 2 (stating that limited liability "seems
inconsistent with the increased use of strict liability and other modern tort doctrines to extend liability to the enterprise"); see also Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in CorporationLaw, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117,
145 (1980) (stating "limited liability ... may undermine the deterrent objectives of
the tort system"); Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of
Their Corporations?,76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1195 (1967) ("[Llimited liability thwarts the
objectives of modern tort law-compensation for the injured, deterrence of future
accidents, and punishment of the personally culpable.").
'9 See infra Part III.
20 Prior to 1990 only two states, Wyoming and Florida, had passed LLC statutes.
Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 378 n.3.
The frenzy with which states have acted is perhaps best illustrated by the passage of the legislation in California as an "urgency measure," which went into effect
immediately upon enactment, although state officials argued they would be unable
to administer the law that quickly. See CAL. SENATE COMM. ANALYSIS, Aug. 15,
1994.
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sure both from the legal and business communities,2 few state
legislatures seem to have considered these questions." While
states have examined possible revenue losses from the measures,' few have studied the consequences of shifting business
losses onto creditors and tort victims. The academic literature
on the subject of LLCs has been similarly accepting of the new
form.24 This is surprising in light of the extensive debate surrounding corporate limited liability.' It is also surprising in
21 See infra notes 69-85 and accompanying
text.
22

See, e.g., Timothy Middleton, Corporate Form Offers Unlimited Appeal,

CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS., Apr. 20-26, 1992, at 9 (noting absence of organized opposition to
New York LLC legislation).
23 See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM BILL, supra note 13, at 12 (predicting loss to
New York State of "$40 minion annually by the fifth year following the adoption of
the LLC" but suggesting "loss will be offset somewhat by increased business activity
in New York State"); Alan Breznick, Accountants Seek Entity To Limit Liability,
CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Aug. 31-Sept. 6, 1992, at 3 (noting that major hurdle to passage
of LLC bill in New York is legislature's concern with loss of revenue); Daniel B.
Moskowitz, New Way To Organize Business Is Gaining Wider Acceptance, WASH.
POST, Nov. 4, 1991, at F14 ("The big fear in many legislatures is that LLCs will cost
states revenue."); Limited LiabilityPartnershipsfor Law Firms, MASS. LAW. WELY.,
Aug. 14, 1995, at 10 ("Although the creation of limited liability companies could
result in some direct loss of tax revenue for the commonwealth, proponents of the
LLC bill argue that any tax losses will be offset by attracting new businesses and
keeping existing businesses in-state.").
' See, e.g., Peter D. Hutcheon, The New Jersey Limited Liability Company
Statute: Backgroundand Concepts, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 111, 160 (1993) ("LLCs
are, much like the common law constructs of the judges of King's Bench and perhaps
especially Lord Mansfield, a reasoned and practical response to the needs of business and commercial transactions.").
2' Halpern et al., supra note 18, at 117 ("[The] merits of the doctrine of limited
liability in corporation law have been the subject of passionate disagreement
amongst otherwise level-headed commentators. ... ").
For examples of scholars who favor retaining corporate limited liability, see
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 92 (arguing that limited liability is necessary for efficient functioning of capital markets); Richard A. Posner, The Rights of
Creditorsof Affiliated Corporations,43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976) (supporting limited liability within corporate groups); Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of
the Corporation:Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev.
148 (1992) (developing idea that limited liability was necessary to "democratize" opportunities for investment).
Scholars who would reduce the liability shield of corporations include Blumberg,
supra note 15, at 576-77 (criticizing application of limited liability to corporate
groups); Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand. Feministand Other Reflections
on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1454
(1992) (criticizing corporate limited liability from feminist perspective and suggesting scheme of mandatory insurance to mitigate some of its social harms); Hansmann
& Kraakman, supra note 15, at 1896 (advocating unlimited pro rata shareholder liability for corporate torts); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and
Creditors, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 1565, 1569 (1991) (also suggesting pro rata share-
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light of the increased willingness of some courts to disregard
corporate limited liability and pierce the corporate veil. 6
LLCs, which can be managed by investors who have limited
liability, resemble close corporations. 7 Yet it is in the context of
close corporations that limited liability has received the most
scrutiny, 8 and that courts have been most willing to hold invesholder liability for corporate torts); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close CorporationsReconsidered, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1147-48 (1989) (criticizing limited liability as well
as other corporate attributes in close corporation setting); Note, supra note 18, at
1196 (suggesting choice of unlimited shareholder liability or compulsory liability insurance for active investors in close corporations); see also Peter Z. Grossman, The
Market for Shares of Companies with Unlimited Liability: The Case of American
Express, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 66 (1995) (tracing history of modern unlimited liability firm and disputing notion that limited liability is necessary for functioning of
capital markets); see generally, Halpern et al., supra note 18 (suggesting unlimited
liability regime for closely held companies).
For the view that limited liability is economically irrelevant, see Roger E. Meiners et al., Piercingthe Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351 (1979).
26 Shareholders in close corporations are increasingly at risk of being held personally liable. Barbara Marsh, Suits Go After PersonalAssets of Firm Owners, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 13, 1993, at B-1 ("shield of incorporation is wearing perilously thin for a
growing number of small-business owners").
Federal courts have been increasingly willing to pierce the corporate veil when
failing to hold shareholders personally liable will defeat a legislative policy. Thus
federal courts have held shareholders personally liable for corporate violations of,
among others, the following statutes: pollution abatement costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
("C.E.R.C.L.A."), see, e.g., Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D.
Mich. 1989); In re Acushnet River and New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F.
Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987), pension fund contributions under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("E.R.I.S.A."), see, e.g., Laborers' Pension Trust
Fund-Detroit and Vicinity v. Family Cement Co., 677 F.Supp. 896 (E.D. Mich. 1987),
and for employee wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("F.L.S.A."), see, e.g.,
Gusdonovich v. Business Information Company, 705 F. Supp. 262 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
For a comprehensive discussion and criticism of the federal policy in this area
see STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 3 (1991).
For the contrary view that courts are no more likely to pierce the corporate veil
today than they have been at any time during the past few decades, see Robert B.
Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1036, 1048-49 (1991).
27 Eric Fox, Note, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1152 (1994) ("The nature of the LLC interest, therefore, resembles a partnership, or a closely held corporation, where participation in management is the rule rather than the exception."); cf Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at
395 (noting that because LLC statutes restrict transferability of interests "almost all
LLCs will be closely held"); Ribstein, supra note 1, at 428 ("increased availability of
limited liability through LLCs is likely to affect mostly closely held firms").
2 See Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1147-48 (criticizing limited liability as well as
other corporate attributes in close corporation setting); see also Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 16, at 110 (benefits of limited liability in close corporation setting are fewer, while "incentive ... for managers to undertake overly risky projects is
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tors personally liable.29 The discomfort with limited liability in
the close corporation setting should signal caution with regard to
extending limited liability to another class of owner-managers,
such as LLC members.
This Note questions the wisdom of increasing the number of
investors protected by a limited liability shield, particularly
when the investors are involved in the management of the enterprise. Part I briefly describes the major features of LLCs. Part
II traces the history of the new business entity and exposes the
forces behind its sudden popularity. It explains why little opposition to the form has surfaced, despite its potential for social
harm. Part III explores the traditional justifications for limited
liability in the corporate context to see whether they support extending limited liability to LLC members." Part IV looks at the
criticisms that have been leveled against limited liability in the
corporate context to determine whether they would apply
equally, or more forcefully, against limited liability in the LLC
context. Included in this part is a discussion of the policies supporting enterprise liability and their applicability to LLCs. Finally, Part V suggests a scheme of mandatory insurance to mitigate the potentially harmful effects of LLCs.
I. MAJOR FEATURES OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
The LLC is a new organizational form which, if properly
structured, combines the limited liability of a corporation32 with
much more severe"); Halpern et al., supra note 18, at 149 ("unlimited liability regime is the most efficient regime for small, closely held companies"); Note, supra
note 18, at 1196-97 (advocating unlimited tort liability for shareholders of close corporations).
2DSee Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1169 ("[Close corporations are at a significantly greater risk of veil-piercing than publicly held corporations."); see also
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 109 ("[Allmost every case in which a court
has allowed creditors to reach the assets of shareholders has involved a close corporation."); Thompson, supra note 26, at 1038 ("likelihood of piercing increases as the
number of shareholders decreases").
" Lawrence Mitchell conducts a similar analysis for close corporations in which
he concludes that limited liability is not justified in firms where owners manage. See
supra note 25.
31 Wyoming enacted the first limited liability company statute in 1977. Gazur &
Goff, supra note 7, at 389. However, the form did not really begin to catch on until
1988, when the I.R.S. issued Revenue Ruling 88-76, which determined that a Wyoming limited liability company would be taxed as a partnership. Id. at 390; Rev. Rul.
88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
32 The language granting limited liability to LLC members is even broader than
the language granting limited liability to corporate shareholders. Compare, e.g.,
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the pass-through taxation of a partnership.33 Adding to its apDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(6) (1995) ("the stockholders or members of a corporation shall not be personally liable for the payment of the corporation's debts ...
with DEL. CODE ANN. § 18-303 (a) (1995):
the debts, obligations and liabilities of a limited liability company, whether
arising in contract, tort or otherwise, shall be solely the debts, obligations
and liabilities of the limited liability company, and no member or manager
of a limited liability company shall be obligated personally for any such
debt, obligation or liability ....
Id; see also UNIF. LTD. LIABILITY Co. ACT [hereinafter U.L.L.C.A] § 303(a) (1994)
(amended 1995) ("A member or manager is not personally liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company solely by reason of being or acting as a member or
manager."); N.Y. LIMIT. LIAB. Co. LAW § 609(a):
Neither a member of a limited liability company, a manager of a limited liability company managed by a manager or managers nor an agent of a
limited liability company (including a person having more than one such
capacity) is liable for any debts, obligations or liabilities of the limited liability company or each other, whether arising in tort, contract or otherwise, solely by reason of being such member, manager or agent or acting
(or omitting to act) in such capacities or participating (as an employee,
consultant, contractor or otherwise) in the conduct of the business of the
limited liability company.
Id. The liability of LLC members, like that of corporate shareholders, is limited to
the amount invested. See Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 378.
3 In a 1988 Revenue Ruling, the I.R.S. classified a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for taxation purposes. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. The Service applied the
tests found in Treasury Regulation § 301.7701. Id. The regulations classify organizations based on four corporate characteristics: centralization of management, continuity of life, free transferability of interests, and limited liability. Treas. Reg. §
301.7701 (1992). An entity that possesses more corporate than non-corporate characteristics is taxed as a corporation. Id. The Service found that the Wyoming LLC
possessed the characteristics of centralized jnanagement and limited liability, but
lacked the characteristics of continuity of life and free transferability of interests,
thereby enabling it to be taxed as a partnership. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
Revenue Procedure 95-10, issued in 1995, sets out guidelines for structuring LLCs
to qualify for pass-through taxation. Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20.
Since all LLCs contain the corporate characteristic of limited liability, they must
currently be structured to lack two of the remaining three corporate characteristics
to avoid entity-level corporate taxation. Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability Companies and Limited Partnerships:A Case for Eliminating
the PartnershipClassification Regulations, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 567-68 (1995);
Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 385. That requirement, however, may soon change.
The I.R.S. is currently considering allowing unincorporated businesses simply to
elect whether they wish to be taxed as corporations or partnerships. I.R.S. Notice
95-14, 1995-14, I.R.B. 7. The current rule prohibiting publicly traded partnerships
(or LLCs) from achieving pass-through taxation, however, will not change. See
I.R.C. § 7704 (West 1995).
In drafting their LLC statutes, some states incorporated provisions that guarantee that an LLC formed in the state will meet current requirements for partnership
taxation (i.e., they will lack two corporate characteristics). BISHOP & KLEINBERGER,
supra note 13, 2.09[3], at 2-131 to 2-132 (citing, as example of "bulletproof" statute, Wyoming LLC statute which requires dissolution upon certain events and re-
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peal, the new entity is far more flexible than older limited liability organizational forms.34
Unlike a limited partnership, the LLC is not required to
have a general partner (i.e., someone with full personal liability).35

Unlike limited partners, investors in an LLC (called

"members") can manage the business without jeopardizing their
limited liability status. 6 Similarly, the LLC is not subject to the
many constraints under which the S-corporation operates. Scorporations are limited to a single class of stock 7 and a maximum of thirty-five shareholders, all of whom must be individuals
and United States citizens. 38 By contrast, the ownership and
profit-sharing arrangements that can be adopted by LLCs are
highly flexible.39 Finally, the LLC also provides advantages for
investors over the corporate form." Corporate formalities, such
strictions on transferability of interests, thus ensuring that LLC formed in Wyoming
will not have corporate characteristics of continuity of life or free transferability of
interests. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-122, 123 (Michie 1989)). Other states have chosen to adopt flexible statutes, allowing parties to vary statutory default rules, and
leaving it to the corporate and tax lawyers to ensure that the entity as it is ultimately structured qualifies for pass-through taxation. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, S 2.09[3], at 2-131 to 2-132.
For a history of the I.R.S.'s treatment of LLCs, see Hamill, supra, at 571-78. For
in-depth treatments of tax classification issues, see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra,
note 13, at 2.01-2.12; Gazur & Goff, supra note 7, at 439-53; Keatinge et al., supra
note 1, at 423-42.
' Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 417 ("Because the LLC statutes provide only
a minimal number of mandatory rules, LLC members have a great deal of freedom
in organizing the LLC's economic and management structure."); see also Barge, supra note 7, at 16 (noting that New York's LLC statute eliminates need for corporate
formalities such as directors, officers, bylaws and minutes); Fox, supra note 27, at
1147 (citing "flexible management alternatives" as one of the "most important provisions" LLCs have to offer).
Many authors have compared the LLC to other organizational forms. See, e.g.,
BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, T 3.01-3.12, at 3-1 to 3-91; Gazur & Goff,
supra note 7, at 459-62; Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 386-403.
5 The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act defines a limited partnership
as having "one or more general partners and one or more limited partners."
R.U.L.P.A. §101(7).
* See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
17 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(d) (West 1995).
3 I.R.C. §1361(b)(1)(A)-(C) (West 1995). A further restriction prevents Scorporations from being a member of an affiliated group. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(2)(a) (West
1995).
:9 But see infra note 64 and accompanying text (noting debate over whether
LLCs can be comprised of only one member and receive beneficial tax treatment).
" LLCs will not qualify for pass-through taxation if they are publicly traded.
See I.R.C. § 7704 (West 1995). One can imagine a situation where investors would
choose to organize a publicly-traded entity as an LLC rather than a corporation. Al-
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as management by a board of directors,4 ' need not be observed,
and profits and losses can be shared without regard to the
amount or form of capital invested.42
Because the LLC has tax and structural advantages over
other limited liability forms, it has caused a great deal of excitement among lawyers.4" Accordingly, investors across the nation
have rushed to organize as LLCs." To form an LLC, an organizer, who need not be a member of the LLC, files articles of organization.45 The resulting enterprise is governed by an operating agreement adopted by the members.46
LLCs can be formed for a broad range of purposes.47 Profesthough the form would not provide tax advantages, it would have greater organizational flexibility.
41 See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, $ 3.08[4][a], at 3-24 (noting that
most LLC statutes provide default rule of decentralized management, and of those
statutes that provide for centralized management, only one state, Colorado, does not
allow members to change rule).
42 Id.
T 3.09[4], at 3-36 to 3-37 ("[Elntity can allocate profits and losses in a way
that deviates from normal or past profit or loss percentages or that is out of proportion to the owners' respective capital interests.... Corporations generally lack such
flexibility.").
The prediction, by a leading author on the subject, that the development of
the LLC "promises to change the law of business associations radically" is typical of
the legal community's response. Ribstein, supra note 1, at 475.
In Ohio, for example, 3,586 businesses filed to become limited liability companies in 1995, the first year the form was available in that state. Taft Lauds Success of Limited Liability Company Law, BUS. WIRE, July 13, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Bwire file. In Virginia, 6,581 limited liability companies had
been formed as of April 12, 1995. The Virginia legislation was enacted in 1992. IRS
Makes Limited Liability Companies More Attractive, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS, Apr. 23, 1995, at Fl.
' See, e.g., N.Y. LIMIT. LIAB. Co. LAW § 203 (1994); U.L.L.C.A. § 202 (1994)
(amended 1995); BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, $ 5.0511][a], at 5-45. The
Delaware statute uses the terminology "certificate of formation." DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 18-201 (1992) (amended 1994).
" See, e.g., N.Y. LIMIT. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a) (1994) ("members of a limited
liability company shall adopt a written operating agreement"); U.L.L.C.A. § 103
(1994) (amended 1995) ("members of a limited liability company may enter into an
operating agreement, which need not be in writing"); see also, U.L.L.C.A. § 103 cmt.
("The operating agreement is the essential contract that governs the affairs of a
limited liability company.").
Delaware uses the terminology "limited liability company agreement." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (1992) (amended 1994). The operating agreement is the
equivalent of the partnership agreement or corporate bylaws. Gazur & Goff, supra
note 7, at 409. In most states the adoption of an operating agreement is optional.
BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, 915.06[1][c] at 5-67.
47 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-106(a) (1992) ("limited liability company
may carry on any lawful business, purpose or activity with the exception of the
business of granting policies of insurance, or assuming insurance risks or banking");
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sional firms have been among the first to reorganize as LLCs."
The LLC has been touted for joint ventures49 and venture capital
firms,' ° among other uses.5 Likewise, they have been recommended for closely held companies52 and for risky ventures " such
as start-ups,54 oil and gas ventures, 5 and real estate transacU.L.L.C.A. § 112(a) (1994) (amended 1995) ("limited liability company may be organized under this [Act] for any lawful purpose, subject to any law of this State governing or regulating business"); see also Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 419 ("states
have imposed few restrictions upon an LLC's activities").
"' James Woehlke et al., LLCs: The Business Planner's Dream Entity, CPA J.,
June, 1995, at 16. However, not all states allow professionals to organize as LLCs.
Bryan Smith, Comment, The ProfessionalLiability Crisis and the Need for Professional Limited Liability Companies: Washington's Model Approach, 18 SEATTLE
UNIV. L. REV. 557, 560 (1995) (jT]hree states prohibit professionals from becoming
LLCs ... thirty-six allow them to do so, and the remainder of the states omit any
mention of use by professionals.") (citations omitted); see also BISHOP &
KLEINBERGER, supranote 13, 6.06[1], at 6-49 to 6-52.
For professionals to practice in LLC form, in addition to enabling legislation,
they need the approval of the agency regulating the practice of that profession.
Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 458. Thus, whether attorneys can organize under a
state LLC statute, is a matter for the state bar association or the state highest
court. Id.; see also Thom Weidlich, Limiting Lawyers' Liability: LLPs Can Protect
Assets of Innocent Partners,NAT'L L.J., Feb. 7, 1994, at 1 ("supreme courts in about
half [the] states [with LLC statutes] have not changed their ethics rules to allow
lawyers to form them"). The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(A.I.C.P.A.), which regulates which business forms accountants may adopt, voted in
1990 "with overwhelming approval" to allow accountants to organize in LLC form.
Keatinge et al., supra, note 1, at 459. They did so without requiring any minimum
capitalization or minimum insurance. Id.
49 Barge, supra note 7, at 16; Gerard R. Boyce & Dan C. Aardal, Limited Liability Companies as Joint Venture Vehicles, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 12, 1995, at 5 (comparing
LLC with other organizational forms for use in joint ventures).
1.02[1], at 1-13; Kontzer, supra
'4 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13,
note 13, at 3 ("likely candidates to form LLCs include venture capital firms").
" Jim Connolly, Limited Liability Cos.' Use Rises in Real Estate Deals, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, May 2, 1994, at 67 (suggesting LLCs for institutional investors who
"demand more of a say in their investments"); Gerry Donohue, New Business Entity
Attracts Builders, BUILDER, May, 1994, at 156 (suggesting LLCs for developers).
52 Brian L. Schorr & Sylvia Wong, New York Enacts Limited
Liability Company
Law, INSIGHTS, Oct. 1994, at 24 (suggesting use of LLCs for family businesses and
"entrepreneurial businesses with a small number of active investors").
w Woehlke et al., supra note 48, at 16 ("To date, the key uses of LLCs have been
businesses traditionally conducted in the partnership form, but which entail a high
level of risk.").
Barge, supra note 7, at 16 ("LLCs are attractive to high-risk ventures such as
start-ups or high-tech firms"); Middleton, supra note 22, at 9 (noting LLCs use for
"start-ups, small businesses and enterprises looking for outside investors").
" See, e.g., Risa Lynn Wolf-Smith, Independents Can Benefit from Limited Liability Company Structure, OIL & GAS J., Nov. 14, 1994, at 67 (suggesting LLC for
"inherently risky oil and gas ventures").
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tions.56 The truth is that the form is so new and so flexible no
one is certain what investors will do with it.57 One thing is clear,
however, one of the keys to the success of the new form is its potential for liability avoidance. As discussed in Part IV, the wide
availability of limited liability in an entity where investors manage may have damaging social consequences.
LLC statutes permit members either to manage the LLC or
to choose member or non-member managers.58 In a membermanaged LLC, each member is an agent of the LLC, and the
LLC is bound by the acts of any member having actual or apparent authority. 59 In contrast, members of a manager-managed
LLC are not agents of the LLC.6° While interests in an LLC are
assignable,61 as in a partnership, assignment of an interest does
not automatically provide the assignee with management
rights.62 Some statutes even permit the formation of an LLC
'6 Gregory P. Pressman & Stephanie R. Breslow, New Limited Liability Company Law Goes Into Effect, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1994, at S1 (comparing LLC to older
business forms for real estate ventures, and suggesting LLC is superior to partnerships in avoiding liability for "environmental noncompliance, taxes, torts, [and]
claims" and superior to corporations in allowing members to write off depreciation,
amortization, and other losses on personal income taxes); IRS Makes Limited Liability Companies More Attractive, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Apr. 23, 1995,
at F1 (noting that LLC "protects commercial real estate investors in an era when
lawsuits over fair housing complaints, Americans with Disabilities Act complaints
and third-person assaults on tenants threaten the economic welfare of property
owners"); see also Gazur & Goff, supra note 7, at 470 (estate planning); Keatinge et
al., supra note 1, at 407-9 (professional firms); Kontzer, supra note 13, at 3 (venture
capital firms, real estate developers and small industrial companies); Middleton,
supra note 22, at 9 (real estate joint ventures).
5' Woehlke et al., supra note 48, at 16 ("Business advisors have only begun exploring the uses that the unique set of features offered by the LLC brings to the table.").
58See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (1992) (amended 1994); N.Y. LIMIT.
LIAB. Co. LAW § 401 (1994); U.L.L.C.A. § 404 (1994) (amended 1995). Most states
provide for a default rule of member management. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra
note 13, 1.01[4][c], at 1-12. Colorado requires that an LLC be managed by managers. COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-401(1) (1990) (amended 1994). However, all members
can be managers. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, 7.021l], at 7-5 n.4.
" See, e.g., N.Y. LIMIT. LIAB. CO. LAW § 412; U.L.L.C.A. § 301(1),(2) (1994)
(amended 1995). These provisions are modeled on U.P.A. § 9. BISHOP &
KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, T 3.08[6][f], at 3-33.

" See, e.g., N.Y. LIMIT. LIAB. CO. LAW § 412(b)(1) (1994); U.L.L.C.A. § 301(b)(1)
(1994) (amended 1995).
6' See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(a) (1992) (amended 1994).
12 Statutes incorporate restrictions on transferability to assist LLCs in qualifying for pass-through taxation. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Some statutes simply provide a default rule. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-704 (1992):
(a) An assignee of a limited liability company interest may become a mem-
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with only one member.' However, the Internal Revenue Service
("I.R.S.") has not yet ruled on whether a single-member LLC
would be classified as a partnership for income tax purposes."
II. FORCES BEHIND LLC ADOPTIONS

Why have states rushed to pass LLC legislation? Critical to
the acceptance of this new organizational form was a 1988 Revenue Ruling, classifying a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for tax
purposes." Absent pass-through taxation, LLCs present few
benefits over the corporate form. Initially, however, the I.R.S.
proposed regulations that required any firm in which all members possessed limited liability to be taxed as a corporation.66
These regulations would have required LLCs to pay entity-level
taxation. The I.R.S. withdrew the proposed regulations, however, when faced with strong opposition from the business comOne author has suggested that tax regulations will
munity.'
continue to favor LLCs because no "powerful interest group" is
injured by them.'
Another impetus behind the adoption of LLC statutes is

ber as provided in a limited liability company agreement and upon:
(1) The approval of all of the members of the limited liability company
other than the member assigning his limited liability company interest; or
(2) Compliance with any procedure provided for in the limited liability
company agreement.
Id.; N.Y. LIMIT. LIAB. Co. LAW § 603 (1994) ("Except as provided in the operating
agreement ...an assignment of a membership interest does not ...entitle the as-

signee to participate in the management and affairs of the limited liability company.
See, e.g., N.Y. LIMIT. LIAB. Co. LAW § 203(c) (1994); U.L.L.C.A. § 202(a) (1994)
(amended 1995).
" See Alan E.Weiner & James A. Woehlke, Temporary Regs Needed for SingleMember LLCs, ACCT. TODAY, Dec. 12, 1994, at 53 (noting uncertainty in I.R.S.
treatment of single-member LLCs and calling on I.R.S. to issue temporary regulations to guide investors); see also, BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13,

3.02[2],

at 3-5 n.12 (suggesting that single-member LLCs will be classified as corporations
for income tax purposes); Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 430 ("LLCs must have at
least two members to secure partnership status").
" Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360; see supra note 33 (discussing Revenue Ruling in detail); see also supra note 20 (explaining that prior to ruling only two states,
Wyoming and Florida, had passed LLC legislation).
'Prop. Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2, 45 FED. REG. 75, 709 (1980).
See Hamill, supra note 33, at 576-77; Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 383.
"sRibstein, supra note 1, at 473.
67
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competition among states for business and filing fees. 9 In a
classic "race for the bottom" scenario, the first LLC statutes were
adopted with the goal of attracting business while subsequent
7
state adoptions have been triggered by a fear of being left out. 1
Promoters of the legislation also claim LLCs will increase overall

69 GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM BILL, supra note 13, at 12 ("The bill will attract businesses to New York State.... Adoption of LLC legislation in New York will be a significant step in promoting New York as a competitive location for conducting and
establishing business enterprises"); Gazur & Goff, supra note 7, at 389 (noting that
Wyoming legislators hoped to "lure business to their state" or at least
"organizational activities"); Ribstein, supra note 1, at 473.
The arguments that have been advanced to support the passage of LLC statutes
are many of the same arguments that were raised in support of limited liability for
corporations in the 19th Century. For example, in 1825, in a speech to the Massachusetts legislature, Governor Levi Lincoln said a policy of unlimited liability was
driving capital from the state. E. Merrick Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability
in American Industry: Massachusetts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1351, 1366-67 (1948). The
author disputes Governor Lincoln's assertion. Id. at 1368; see also Mitchell, supra
note 25, at 1168 (explaining that no definite legislative policy led to adoption of limited liability as general principle).
'0 The first LLC statute was created as special interest legislation for an oil
company. Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 383. Florida passed an LLC statute to attract foreign businesses accustomed to the Limitada form, a limited liability entity
somewhat similar to the LLC that exists in Latin America. Gazur & Goff, supra note
7, at 388-89 and n.8. See also Daily Rep. for Exec., BNA, July 19, 1991, at H-6
("Texas has adopted a limited liability company law ... designed to encourage business formation in the state.").
71 See, e.g., New York State Division of the Budget Recommendation
of Senate
Bill 7511-A (recommending LLC legislation because it would "attract more businesses to either come to New York or deter out-migration to competing states");
CAL. SENATE COMM. ANALYSIS, Aug. 31, 1994 ("California should quickly adopt this
bill so that it will be competitive with 35 other states which have adopted LLCs").
California adopted the legislation as an "urgency" measure that went into effect the
day it was passed, despite concern that the Secretary of State would be unable to
immediately administer a law of that magnitude. CAL. SENATE COMM. ANALYSIS,
Aug. 15, 1994; see also Kontzer, supra note 13, at 3 (describing legislation as
"urgency" measure, despite strong opposition from California Trial Lawyers Association).
Similarly, New York adopted the LLC form amid concern of losing new business.
See Breznick, supra note 23, at 3 (warning that delay in passage "could cost New
York dearly in the fierce competition among states for new business"); Karon
Walker, New York Considers a Hybrid: Limited Liability Companies, N.Y. L.J., Oct.
12, 1993, at 12 (warning that New York, which had not yet passed LLC legislation,
faced danger that neighboring states that had enacted LLC legislation would "lure
businesses eager to use [the form] away from New York"); see also Limited Liability
Partnershipsfor Law Firms, MASS. LAW. WKLY, Aug. 14, 1995, at 10 (noting that
Massachusetts, which had not yet passed LLC or LLP statute "needs some form of
limited liability entity to remain competitive with other states in attracting and
keeping businesses ... Many lawyers in the commonwealth are concerned that legal
business is being lost to out-of-state lawyers").
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investment.72
Perhaps no group has lobbied more vigorously for passage of
LLC legislation than professionals. 7' Lawyers and accountants
hope to organize as LLCs,74 or as limited liability partnerships,7 5
a related business form, in an attempt to limit their malpractice
exposure.7 6 Professionals who organize as a general partnership
are jointly and severally liable for malpractice committed by a
member of the firm.77 By contrast, while the assets of the LLC
are available to satisfy a judgment against a member of the firm,
a professional is not personally liable for the malpractice of another member solely by reason of being a member of an LLC.78
The limitation of personal liability for professionals has become more important than ever because they are increasingly
the targets of lawsuits. 79 For example, government regulators
72 See Breznick, supra note 23, at 3 (noting promoters' claims that LLCs would
"encourage] new business ventures and fresh capital formation"). This argument
has been advanced as a reason for corporate limited liability as well; see infra notes
108-117 and 124-130, and accompanying text.
73See, e.g., Breznick, supra note 23, at 3 (describing lobbying efforts of major
accounting groups, lawyers, and other business interests in favor of LLC legislation); Kontzer, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that attorneys and tax specialists actively
supported California bill); see also Hutcheon, supra note 24, at 123 ("New Jersey
Society of Certified Public Accountants lobbied vigorously for the enactment of LLC
legislation"); Cm. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 22, 1994, at 1 (noting that Chicago Bar Association had proposed changes in Illinois Supreme Court Rules to allow attorneys
to organize as LLCs).
7' Brezick, supra note 23, at 3 (noting that lawyers had "started the crusade
for LLCs," and groups like American Institute of Certified Public Accountants had
made it "their top priority"); see also Ribstein, supra note 1, at 474 ("Bar groups are
a potentially potent interest group in pressing for LLC legislation.").
7"Don Milazzo, Big Six Make the Switch to Limited Liability Partnerships,
BIRMINGHAM BUS. J., Aug. 29, 1994, at 17 ("Each of the Big Six accounting firms has
converted or will convert to a limited liability partnership.").
For a discussion of LIP statutes, see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13,
1.03, at 1-17 to 1-18.
'6 See, e.g., Barge, supra note 7, at 16 (noting that law firms all across country
are considering converting to LLCs); Alan Breznick, More Firms Suit Up for Legal
Struggles, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS., Jan. 27, 1992, at 33 (noting accountants' desire to organize as LLCs to reduce their exposure to law suits); Julius A. Karash, KC Legal
Firm Transforming,KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 1, 1994, at B1 (noting national trend of
law firms to convert to LLCs).
U.P.A. § 15 (1914).
78 Even when professionals are allowed to organize as LLCs they remain liable
for their own malpractice and the malpractice of those they supervise. See Smith,
supra note 48, at 575.
79 Brezick, supra note 76, at 33 (noting that suits against accountants had increased in each of preceding 10 years); see also Smith, supra note 48, at 557
("professionals are being subjected to lawsuits at an alarming rate").
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have sued accountants and lawyers for their roles in the savings
and loan crisis and the Bank of Credit and Commerce
("B.C.C.I.") scandal,"° extracting multi-million dollar settlements."' The size of professional malpractice awards generally
has also been rising. 2 Accounting firms have collapsed under
the weight of these judgments, leaving partners to pay for the
shortfall out of their own personal assets.' Thus, for professional firms, which are generally not asset-rich, regulator suits
raise the specter of personal bankruptcy for partners." Another
separate, but important benefit for lawyers and accountants in
the passage of LLC legislation, is the increase in the demand for
their services, as businesses reorganize under the new form.'
Ironically, professionals are the one group that has met with
strong opposition in their attempt to organize as LLCs.' The
80

Breznick, note 76, at 33 (noting that as result of savings and loan crisis and

B.C.C.I. scandal "nearly all of the Big Six [accounting] firms in New York are fighting major lawsuits"); Smith, supra note 48, at 564-67 (noting that professionals have
somewhat unfairly been made to serve as "deep pockets" in savings and loan crisis
and federal securities litigation).
81 See, e.g., Weidlich, supra note 48, at 1 (listing settlements paid by law firms:
"$41 million from New York's Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler; $45 million
from New York's Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison; $51 million from Jones,
Day, Reavis & Pogue"); Breznick, supra note 76, at 33 (listing settlements paid by
large and midsize accounting firms); see also Harvey L. Pitt & Dixie L. Johnson, The
Banking Scandal: An Era of New Standardsfor Professionals?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23,
1992, at 1 ("respected jurists and a chorus of federal banking regulators have sought
to focus attention on service professionals for their purported contribution to the
[savings and loan] debacle"); Charles F. Williams, State Bar To Eye Limited Liability for Law Firms, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 22, 1994, at 1 (speculating that Resolution Trust Corporation suing attorneys was impetus for attorneys to try to organize as LLCs).
82 See Breznick, supra note 76, at 33.
82 Id. (describing bankruptcy of Laventhol & Horwath, midsize Philadelphia accounting firm).
" Id. But see Edward A. Adams, Firms Expected To Make Switch to New Format, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 1994, at 1 (noting that few malpractice judgments exceed
professional firm's insurance policy limits).
8 Ribstein, supra note 1, at 474 ("The significant financial benefits of LLCs
make them attractive to business people and, therefore, generate fees for lawyers
during a general recession for legal business."); Paul Demery, L.L.P. Law Passes in
New York, ACCT. TODAY, July 25, 1994, at 1 ("spread of limited liability formats
carries an added opportunity [for accountants]: helping private company clients to
convert from S corporation status or even C corporations").
88 See Hutcheon, supra note 24, at 123 (noting that "[o]rganized opposition was
expected had the [New Jersey LLC] bill contained provisions expressly authorizing
the use of LLCs by professionals"); Weidlich, supra note 48, at 1 (discussing opposition in Texas and California to allowing lawyers to organize as LLCs); see generally
Smith, supra note 48, at 577-79 (discussing legislative history of "no professionals"
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plaintiffs' bar and the public have prevented professionals from
organizing under this form in some states.87 Yet even plaintiffs'
lawyers, perhaps the most natural opposition to any liability
limiting measure," face a conflict of interest in opposing LLCs.
On the one hand, they want to reach the assets of individual investors when representing clients; on the other hand, they hope
to limit their own exposure for malpractice by organizing as
LLCs.89
Nevertheless, perhaps the main reason for the success of the
new form is the lack of an organized opposition." This is not

surprising, however, considering that the people most likely to
be hurt by the legislation, future tort victims who will be unable
to reach individual investor's assets,9' are not yet identifiable.
The legislation also hurts the public, which loses the benefit of
entity level tax revenues from firms that organize as LLCs
rather than corporations. 2 Surprisingly, this effective reduction
in federal corporate tax revenues did not require passage of a
bill, but was instead achieved quietly, through a change in I.R.S.
regulations." Similarly, state LLC legislation has been advanced
not as a way to reduce business' share of taxes, but as a way to
limit firms' liability, effectively downplaying the tax impact.9 4
clauses in LLC statutes).
"7 See, e.g., Kontzer, supra note 13, at 3 ("Strong opposition from the California
Trial Lawyers Association prevented the [LLC law from applying to professional
service corporations, such as law and accounting firms."). In Texas, critics dubbed
the original LLC legislation the "help a lawyer bill." Weidlich, supra note 48, at 1.
The bill passed after it was revised to exclude professionals. Id. However, the lawyers eventually got their way. Texas amended its LLC statute in 1993 to allow professionals to organize under it. Id.
In Washington, plaintiffs lawyers failed to convince the legislature to require all
LLCs to carry a minimal level of insurance. Jessica A. Eaves, A Step in the Right
Direction:Washington Passes the Limited Liability Company Act, 18 PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 197, 202-03 (1994). However, they succeeded in lobbying the legislature to
require Professional LLCs to carry at least a million dollars of insurance. Id.
The plaintiffs' bar in many states has unsuccessfully opposed passage of
LLCs. See, e.g., Eaves, supra note 87, at 200-02 (describing opposition of Washington State Trial Lawyers Association to that state's LLC legislation).
"' The situation in Texas is instructive. The plaintiffs' bar there opposed the
passage of a limited liability partnership bill. Weidlich, supra note 48, at 1. However, once the bill passed, they "fell in line" and organized under it. Id.
so See, e.g., Middleton, supra note 22, at 9 (noting absence of organized opposition to New York LLC legislation).
"See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
93 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying
text.
'4 Members of the business community have argued that no loss in state reve-
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Finally, the legislation can be seen as part of the backlash
against real or imagined tort excesses." Even if one were to accept that the tort system needs reform, however, the solution
would be to reform it, not to exempt whole classes of individuals
through a new organizational form."
III. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CORPORATE LIMITED
LIABILITY
One of the historic justifications for corporate limited liability is that the corporation is an entity separate from its shareholders. 7 The entity theory makes sense in the context of the
large public corporation, where shareholders are passive investors and the corporation is run by managers and a board of directors. While arguably it is unfair to hold passive investors liable
for the actions of managers,9 8 is it really more fair for the loss to
nue will actually occur because primarily partnerships and not corporations will
switch to this business form. See supra note 13. States do not agree with this argument, however, and have projected revenue losses. See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM
BILL, supra note 13, at 12 (projecting $40,000,000 loss annually to State of New
York as result of LLC legislation by the fifth year of its adoption).
9' See Thompson, supra note 15, at 23 (noting that "[tihe justification that limited liability ... be preserved as a check on runaway tort damages may have some
attraction to those desirous of tort reforms"); see, also, Smith, supra note 48, at 560
(arguing that LLC should provide "protection for accountants and lawyers from the
wave of litigation that has surfaced in recent times").
96Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 1918 ("If the scope of enterprise
liability needs to be narrowed, the appropriate reform is not to invite firms to opt
out of the tort system by exploiting limited liability."); Thompson, supra note 15, at
23 (rejecting preservation of corporate limited liability as "check on runaway tort
damages" and noting that "limited liability [is] an extremely crude check on such
expansive liability if it exists").
97 See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 63438 (1819); Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1158 ("entity theory of the corporation formed
the basis for judicial adoption of the modem principle of limited liability"); see also
Blumberg, supra note 15, at 577 ("concept of the corporation as a separate legal entity ultimately led to the acceptance of the very different doctrine of limited liability").
The notion of the corporation as a separate entity from its members is still very
much part of the law of limited liability in the veil-piercing context. Shareholders
risk losing their limited liability if they fail to treat the corporation as a separate
entity by failing to observe corporate formalities, drastically undercapitalizing the
corporation, or treating the corporation as their alter ego. Thompson, supra note 26,
at 1064.
98 Courts have commented on this unfairness. See Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass.
9,
14 (1819) (cited in Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1163); see also Blumberg, supra note

15, at 586 (noting "lack of utility and fairness in imposing liability on investors for
the acts of the managers"); Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1170 (suggesting that it is
"unfair to impose liability on the noncontrolling shareholder who ... entrusted the
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lie with "passive" tort victims? Accordingly, the entity theory
makes less sense as one moves away from the model of the large
public corporation. 9 In what way is a member-managed LLC,
where there is a unity of ownership and control, an entity separate from its members? If LLC members maintain control, it
seems
fair to hold them liable for the actions of the organiza10
tion. D
Meanwhile, the two-tier tax structure of the corporation
flows from the entity concept.' If the liability of the shareholder
and the corporation are separated because the corporation is a
separate entity, then logically the corporation should be taxed
separately from the shareholder. Business forms such as the Scorporation, the limited partnership, and most recently the LLC,
maintain the entity distinction for liability but not for taxation.
This inconsistency allows investors to have their cake and eat it
too. Entity treatment should be uniform on the issues of taxation and liability-if a firm gets the benefit of limited liability, it
should bear the burden of entity level taxation. °2
A related theory of the corporation describes characteristics
such as limited liability and continuity of life as privileges
granted by the state."' Commentators have suggested that because the corporation benefits from state privileges, it has a duty
to operate in a socially responsible fashion."M This would arguamanagement of the corporation to others"); Note, supra note 18, at 1197.
"3See Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1168 (arguing that entity theory's
"applicability to the close corporation is historically suspect"); see generally Blumberg, supra note 15, at 623-26 (criticizing application of limited liability to shield
parent corporations from liabilities of subsidiaries they control).
100 Several commentators express this idea with regard to shareholders of close
corporations. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1184 (stating that "determining
factor should be whether control and ownership in a particular form of organization
are separated to a sufficient degree that protection of the owners' individual wealth
from the mistakes of management seems fair as well as economically sound").
'0'
Ribstein, supra note 1, at 452 (noting that one rationale offered for double
taxation is that "a corporation is regarded as inherently an entity that should be
treated separately from the members for tax purposes," but author disagrees with
this proposition).
1 But see Ribstein, supra note 1, at 452 (noting that partnerships have many
entiV features and yet are not subject to double taxation).
1 3 See Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1160 (entity theory has "long tradition
in
common-law jurisprudence); see also Presser, supra note 26, at 1-6.
Many state legislatures were at first willing to grant the privilege of limited liability only to corporations that served a public purpose, such as banks and corporations formed to build turnpikes and toll bridges. Dodd, supra note 69, at 1352.
They were unwilling to give the privilege to industrial corporations. Id.
104 See generally Lewis K. Solomon & Kathleen J. Collins, HumanisticEconom-
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bly include supporting the public treasury. In Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co.,"'5 the Supreme Court adopted the "privilege theory"
which holds that the privileges granted to corporations justify
the state's levying of a corporate tax."' The LLC, like the corporation, is a beneficiary of state privileges. Yet it is a creature of
which the state has asked little in the way of social responsibility or tax revenues.' 7
Modern theorists of the corporation dispute the idea that incorporation is a privilege granted by the state. 8 They argue
that corporate characteristics, such as limited liability, can be
achieved by contract, without incorporation, and that incorporation is merely an efficient way of achieving those characteristics. 9 These theorists focus on the benefits society receives from
corporate limited liability."0 One such benefit is the efficient
functioning of capital markets; another is broad participation in
those markets. Both are discussed below.
Building on the work of earlier writers,"' Frank Easterbrook
and Daniel Fischel suggest that limited liability plays a role in
the fimctioning of capital markets."' With a rule of unlimited liability, they argue, investors would be afraid to diversify because
ics: A New Model for the CorporateSocial Responsibility Debate, 12 J. CORP. L. 1331
(1987) (analyzing creation and development of corporations that share greater interest in state's quality of life).
105 220 U.S. 107, 162 (1911) (cited in Ribstein, supra note 1 at 453).
106 Id.
But see Ribstein, supra note 1, at 453 (stating that there is "no reason to
believe that the corporate tax properly measures the value of any benefit from corporate features").
107 See supra notes 65-96 and accompanying text.
...
See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 1, at 454 (arguing that businesses could
achieve most corporate characteristics by contract, without benefit of state statute).
"9 E.g., Posner, supra note 25, at 506 ("[T]he primary utility of corporation law
lies in providing a set of standard, implied contract terms, for example, governing
credit, so that business firms do not have to stipulate these terms anew every time
they transact, although they could do so if necessary.").
It is true that limited liability can be created by contract in certain situations. In
other situations, however, such as where tort victims have not dealt with the corporation, limited liability cannot be achieved by contract. Furthermore, public policy
restricts liability disclaimers in certain situations, such as those involving consumers, see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1995) ("Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.").
10 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 97 ("Both those who want
to raise capital for entrepreneurial ventures, and society as a whole, receive benefits
from limited liability.").
...Notably, Henry G. Manne, Our Two CorporationSystems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967), and Halpern et al., supra note 18.
"2 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 92 ("Limited liability makes markets possible.").
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each additional holding, no matter how small, could expose them
to disastrous losses."' Furthermore, unlimited liability would
require investors to monitor companies more closely because of
the increased risk of liability to shareholders.'
Large public
corporations are only possible because specialized managers act
as agents for shareholders. A rule of unlimited liability would
increase the cost of specialization by increasing the need for
shareholders to monitor those agents."5 In addition, owners
would be forced to monitor other shareholders' wealth to measure their own exposure. 6 Shares could not trade at a single
market price because the investor's wealth would be a factor in
the share price. The wealthier the investor, the greater the risk
associated with the shares. Thus a wealthier investor would
place a lower value on the shares." 7
Because of the advantages of limited liability, Easterbrook
and Fischel theorize that if statutes did not provide for it, firms
would create it by contract.18 Thus, statutory limited liability
reduces transaction costs." 9
As the authors demonstrate, the justifications for limited liability have reduced relevance outside the context of a large
public corporation." ° In smaller firms owners are more likely to
" Id. at 90 (relying on Manne, supra note 111). But see Presser, supra note 25,
at 159 (arguing that shareholders would not be discouraged from investing in regime of unlimited liability because "with large numbers of shareholders the risks to
any one investor seem rather small").
114

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 90.

Id. at 94. The authors recognize that a certain amount of monitoring is inevitable where management is separated from ownership. However, they believe these
agency costs are lower in a regime of limited liability. Id. But see Presser, supra note
25, at 159 (suggesting shareholders would adopt strategies for monitoring in regime
of unlimited liability rather than foregoing investment).
".Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 92 (summarizing work of Halpern).
" Id. But see Presser, supra note 25, at 159 (arguing that limited liability does
not play important role in decision to invest because investors only commit money to
venture they believe will succeed, not one they think will fail).
Historically, it was argued that limited liability was necessary for free transferability of shares. See Dodd, supra note 69, at 1368 (citing Massachusetts' Governor
Lincoln's contention that state's unlimited liability deterred investment).
"'

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 93.
19 Id.
11

...
The authors observe the inappropriateness of extending limited liability to
the close corporation.
In close corporations, there is much less separation between management
and risk bearing. This has profound implications for the role of limited liability. Because those who supply capital in close corporations typically are
also involved in decisionmaking, limited liability does not reduce monitor-
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run the business. As a result, under a rule of unlimited or personal liability, there are few added costs associated with monitoring."1 Additionally, diversification does not play a major role
in the capitalization of small, owner-managed firms. Finally, because these firms are not publicly traded, the need for a uniform
market price is reduced.122
Most often, limited liability companies will resemble close
corporations.123 One of the primary advantages of the LLC is
that, like the close corporation, it allows owners to manage without sacrificing limited liability.
Because many LLCs will be
owner-managed, however, they will not benefit from the reduced
need to monitor provided by limited liability. Likewise, to
achieve pass-through taxation, an LLC cannot be publicly
traded,'25 so the form neither benefits from, nor requires, a uniform share price. Thus, theories that rely on the usefulness of
limited liability to the capital markets cannot provide a rationale
for allowing members of limited liability companies to externalize their costs.
The ideas of Stephen Presser may be of more use to the
ing costs. Other benefits of limited liability in public corporationsfacilitating efficient risk bearing and monitoring by the capital marketalso are absent for close corporations.... Similarly, close corporations restrict the transfer of their shares to ensure that those who invest will be
compatible with existing decisionmakers.
Id. at 110. Despite their discomfort with limited liability in the close corporation
setting, Easterbrook and Fischel do not advocate eliminating it. The authors think
the problem of loss-shifting is sufficiently addressed by the veil-piercing doctrine.
Id.
Their approach begs the question: why preserve a rule if no policy supports it?
Furthermore, the common law doctrine of veil piercing is too infrequently employed
to rectify the inequity of limited liability. See Thompson, supra note 26, at 1048
(finding that courts pierce corporate veil in only 40% of cases in which issue is presented).
'12 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 110. For a similar argument, see
Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1148. Mitchell maintains that close corporations should
not be permitted to exist because corporate attributes, including limited liability,
are only justified where there is "significant" separation of ownership and control.
Mitchell also argues that a high level of monitoring is desirable in owner-managed
entities. Id.
m Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 110; Halpern et al., supra note 18,
at 148 (suggesting that limited liability is not efficient for "small, tightly held companies" which do not benefit from organized securities market); see also Dodd, supra
note 69, at 1379 (noting that during Nineteenth Century, when industrial shares
were not widely traded, need for limited liability was reduced).
'" See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
'2 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
'2'

See supra note 33.
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advocates of LLCs.
Contrary to Easterbrook and Fischel,
Presser argues that limited liability is most beneficial in the
small-firm context. 6 He believes that individuals of moderate
means require the protection of limited liability more than those
who are wealthy, because the former can least afford personal
losses. 7 Presser points out that the nineteenth century limited
liability incorporation statutes were passed in part to democratize opportunities for enrichment. 8 Legislative and judicial pronouncements support the idea that limited liability was created
with small investors in mind." 9 Limited liability encouraged
small investors to participate in industrial development by allowing them to form manufacturing associations without "any
responsibility beyond the amount of the individual subscriptions."30 It has been suggested that widespread participation in
capital markets was critical for American industrialization because the wealth of the capitalist class was limited."' Thus,
limited liability both democratized and encouraged economic development."2
Many LLCs are the small firms that Presser believes most
need the protection of limited liability. Yet the use of limited liability to protect investors who would otherwise be unwilling to
put their personal assets at risk has been criticized for
"artificially support[ing] marginal business ventures at the expense of their creditors.""' Furthermore, creditors often require
personal guarantees from shareholders in close corporations, effectively contracting around the rule of limited liability." There
is no reason to believe creditors will not require similar guaran' Presser, supra note 25, at 163 (noting that "limited liability ought to be most
sacred for smaller firms, and not those possessing great economic wealth").
,27 Id. at 156 ("Without limitations on individual shareholder liability, it was believed, only the very wealthiest men ... could possess the privilege of investing in
corporations."); see also Dodd, supra note 69, at 1372 (suggesting that, after 1830,
availability of limited liability charters in Massachusetts encouraged small business
owners to invest).
' Presser, supra note 25, at 156.
'

Id. at 155-56.

"'Id.at 155 (quoting Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 366, 474 (N.Y. 1822)).
" Id. at 155-56 and n.31.
132 Id.
at 153. For the view that limited liability currently plays a role in encouraginginvestment, see Posner, supra note 25, at 502.
Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1172.
Id. at 1176; see also Halpern et al., supra note 18, at 135 ("[F]or small companies with limited liability creditors often require personal guarantees. This converts the limited liability company into one with unlimited liability.").
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tees from LLC members, thereby making the rule of limited liability inefficient for LLCs, because transaction costs would be
increased by having a default rule that is varied in the majority
of cases. Only tort victims and creditors lacking bargaining
power would be unable to contract around the rule. Similarly,
while the stated rationale for passage of the LLC legislation has
been to stimulate economic investment, commentators have
questioned whether limited liability has any effect on overall investment.'35 The idea that limited liability was necessary for industrialization' begs the question whether limited liability has
outlasted its usefulness, a subject explored more fully in Part
iv.137

Another argument advanced in favor of limited liability is
that creditors are more efficient risk bearers than shareholders.'38 In large public corporations, creditors are often in a better
position than shareholders to evaluate risks and to charge an
appropriate interest rate (or premium) to compensate for the
risk.'39 This is not the case in small firms. " Members of an LLC
who manage the business will know more about the business
than creditors. As a result, they will be in a better position to
assess risks associated with the business than creditors, and
should be more efficient risk bearers.
Finally, commentators have suggested that the procedural
difficulties involved in collecting judgments from large numbers
of shareholders make limited liability the only feasible rule."
"' See Meiners et al., supra note 25, at 352 ("[1limited liability, compared to any
other rule, makes little difference in the allocative outcome in the market for loanable funds"); see also Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1172 (stating that "limited liability
makes little, if any, difference in the decision of small business persons to incorporate").
13' See Dodd, supra note 69, at 1351 ("An important phase of the early development of American manufacturing enterprise was the yielding on the part of one
legislature after another to the demands of American manufacturers for limited liability."); see also Blumberg, supra note 15, at 592 (noting how industrialists
pressed for limited liability).
137 See infra notes 168-85 and accompanying
text.
'u Posner, supra note 25, at 502 ("It may be easier and hence cheaper for the
bank to appraise the risk of a default and the resulting liability than it would be for
the shareholder, who may know little or nothing about the business in which he has
invested.").
139Id.

"o See Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1175-76 (arguing that creditors are not more
efficient risk bearers than close corporation management).
14 See, e.g., Meiners et al., supra note 25, at 363 ("bringing a single action
against a multitude of shareholders, in the case of a publicly held corporation, would
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Widely disbursed shareholders create jurisdictional problems."
When shares are transferred an issue arises as to which shareholders should be held liable.
Since LLCs are unlikely to be
widely traded, however, neither jurisdictional problems nor the
transfer of shares should present obstacles in reaching assets of
individual members.
IV. CRITICISMS OF LIMITED LIABILITY

Limited shareholder liability has been criticized for creating
disincentives for corporations to capitalize adequately,1 ' to insure properly,' or to operate safely. 46 Entities protected by
limited liability can engage in risky behavior knowing that while
probably generate litigation costs higher than most creditors would be willing to
pay"); Note, supra note 18, at 1198 (commenting that "the practical problems would
be immense" when collecting judgments from large numbers of shareholders).
42Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited ShareholderLiability Through a ProceduralLens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 387 (1992).
'4See, e.g., Gabaldon, supra note 25, at 1448 ("When, for instance, would liability attach? At the time of injury? The time of discovery? The time a claim is made?").
Dodd has observed, however, that in the early nineteenth century, Massachusetts,
which required personal shareholder liability in manufacturing corporations, experimented with various rules and finally settled on liability for those who held the
shares at the time of contracting. See Dodd, supra note 69, at 1365; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 1899-1901 (discussing why costs of collection
would not be prohibitive).
'" See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 1917 (criticizing limited
liability regimes that allow: "shareholders ... who benefit ... from intentional
dumping of toxic wastes, from marketing hazardous products without warnings, or
from exposing employees without their knowledge and consent to working conditions known by the firm to pose substantial health risks ... to avoid the resulting
costs simply by limiting the capitalization of their firm"). Id.
Although under-capitalization is one factor courts consider in deciding whether
to pierce the corporate veil, that alone will not usually result in shareholders being
held personally liable. See Note, supra note 18, at 1193-94. But see Ribstein, supra
note 1, at 441 (arguing that large voluntary creditors will "insist on adequate capitalization").
'4 Halpern et al., supra note 18, at 145 (noting that "there is no incentive for
the owner to carry adequate insurance since, in the event of default, there is no cost
to the owner"); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 1889 (noting tendency of
limited liability firms to underinsure). But see Ribstein, supra note 1, at 440-41
(arguing that, notwithstanding limited liability, shareholders will insure to protect
their investment in firm).
. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 1882 ("most familiar inefficiency created by limited liability is the incentive it provides for the shareholder to
direct the corporation to spend too little on precautions to avoid accidents"); Note,
supra note 18, at 1195 (stating that "shareholder immunity conflicts with the premise of tort liability"). But see Ribstein, supra note 1, at 444-45 (arguing that increasing liability of owners will not effect degree of care exercised by agents).
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the owners' full benefit of success accrues, the cost of failure can
be shifted. This "moral hazard" is even greater for entities such
as LLCs in which owners manage.14 7 Owners, more than corporate agents such as directors or officers, benefit directly from the
externalization of risk.14 8 Owners have a greater incentive to undercapitalize19 (because it minimizes their exposure) than do
agents (who are not risking their own capital) or partners (who
are fully personally liable). They are also more likely to underinsure (because the premiums come out of their pockets and
their personal assets are protected) than either agents (who do
not pay the premiums) or partners (who are personally liable).
Lawrence Mitchell has advanced another argument against
limited liability for an entity with unity of ownership and control.8 0 Taking the partnership as the paradigm of such an entity, Mitchell suggests that because a partner can bind the partnership without the benefit of deliberation by a board of
directors, personal liability is necessary to insure that the partner acts prudently. 5 ' What is there to insure that LLC members, who can likewise bind the LLC, act prudently? What will
provide a deliberative process in these new entities?
Notwithstanding the implications of encouraging companies
to engage in socially irresponsible behavior, many states have
passed limited liability company statutes. These statutes have
not surprisingly been touted as the ideal business form for highrisk ventures.'52 To the entrepreneur they are indeed ideal because someone else is bearing part of the risk. That someone
else may be a person injured by a company product or byproduct,
or a trade creditor who dealt with the company, or both.
147 Thompson, supra note 15, at 27 ("When there is an overlap of management
and shareholding, there exists the greatest chance that decisions are being made to
externalize costs."); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 110 ("suggesting that incentive created by limited liability for managers to undertake overly risky
projects is much more severe in close corporations"); Halpern et al., supra note 18,
at 145.
'4 See Halpern et al., supra note 18, at 141 (noting that "moral hazard problem
is likely to be more severe for small, tightly held companies ... because the owners
have a direct interest in the operations of the firm").
'4 This is true not only for a closely held corporation owned by individual
shareholders, but also for a subsidiary corporation controlled by a parent corporation. See generally Blumberg, supra note 15.
'0 Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1180-81 (examining problem of limited liability in
context of close corporations).
"'
152

Id. at 1181-82.
See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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Many commentators have recognized the unfairness of
limited liability in the tort context. 5 ' Unlike contract creditors,
tort victims often cannot contract around limited liability or
charge higher prices or interest rates to compensate for the additional risk."M Modem technologies that greatly increase the
risks of massive tort injuries compound the problem.'5 5
Richard Posner, a strong advocate of limited liability in the
contract arena, has suggested remedying the unfairness to tort
victims by requiring corporations engaged in dangerous activities
to post a bond equal to the highest likely tort damages. 55 Other
scholars have proposed unlimited pro rata shareholder liability
for corporate torts.5 7 LLC statutes, however, do not provide either these or similar protections for tort victims. To the contrary, firms organize as LLCs specifically to shield owners from

tort claims.'53 Yet the risk to tort claimants is far greater from
smaller, more thinly capitalized firms such as LLCs, than from
large public corporations which will usually have sufficient assets to pay claimants.5 9
A certain level of cost externalization might be justified if
the benefits society received from limited liability outweighed
" Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 1880 ("arguing that limited liability in tort cannot be rationalized for either closely-held or publicly-traded corporations"); Note, supra note 18, at 1190-91 ("Corporations owned by affluent shareholders, yet too impoverished to meet their tort liabilities, are the inevitable product of
present-day incorporation laws."); see also Halpern et al., supra note 18, at 145
(noting concern "with the potential for owners of a limited liability corporation to
effect uncompensated transfers of the risk of business failure to [involuntary] creditor"); Posner, supra note 25, at 520 (advocating system of mandatory bond for companies engaged in dangerous activities).
'" They have had no dealings with the company prior to being injured. See
Meiners et al., supra note 25, at 359, 365.
1 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15 at 1880 (cataloging some sources
of risk, including environmental harms and hazardous products).
"6 Posner, supra note 25, at 520.
"5 See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, (suggesting
regime of
pro rata shareholder liability for corporate torts).
m See, e.g., Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 408 (noting that even where personal guarantees of members are desirable because they reduce credit costs, LLC
allows members to give those guarantees and still shield themselves from tort liability). See Note, supra note 18, at 1196-97 (making
this observation in context of
close corporations). Usually is the operative word. Consider the recent case of Dow
Coming which entered bankruptcy rather than face litigation arising out of silicon
gel breast implants. See Barnaby J. Feder, Dow Coming in Bankruptcy over Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1995, at Al; Milo Geyelin, Dow CorningSeeks Chapter 11
Shield, CloudingStatus of Breast-ImplantPact,WALL ST. J., May 16, 1995, at A3.
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the harm caused to its victims.16 ° Yet a number of commentators
dispute the idea that limited liability makes any positive economic contribution at all.16' Historical studies have raised
doubts about whether limited liability was necessary for industrial development 62 or whether it plays a role in the efficient
functioning of capital markets.'63 Scholars have also questioned
whether limited liability reduces transaction costs' or decreases
monitoring by shareholders. 6 ' A suggested alternative to limited
liability is insurance which provides the same benefits for capital
markets but does not externalize the cost of doing business.'66 It
'1But see Note, supra note 18, at 1196 (suggesting that if society benefits from
limited liability, society, not tort victims, should pay cost).
161 See generally Meiners et al., supra note 25, at 352 (arguing that limited liabilit is not critical to corporate form).
Dodd notes that in the early Nineteenth Century, personal liability provisions in manufacturing charters did not "prevent large numbers of Massachusetts
industrialists from seeking incorporation." Dodd, supra note 69, at 1364. Although
Massachusetts began offering limited liability charters in 1830, there was not an
"immediate acceleration" in the number of manufacturing corporations. Id. at 1371;
see also Meiners et al., supra note 25, at 362. Dodd also observes that Massachusetts granted more manufacturing charters than neighboring states, during a period
when it required personal liability and neighboring states granted limited liability.
Dodd, supra note 69, at 1368. However, Dodd believes that eventually a lack of limited liability would have retarded growth. Id. at 1378.
163 See generally Grossman, supra note 25. Grossman examined the market for
shares of the American Express Company in the 1950s. At the time, the company
was an unlimited liability joint stock association and shareholders had pro rata unlimited liability. Id. at 73. According to the study, the shares provided a good rate of
return, were widely traded, and the share price did not vary according to the wealth
of the shareholders. Id. at 75-77. Grossman concludes that "in general, the view that
limited liability is a necessary condition for the functioning of stock markets is refuted." Id. at 66. But see Dodd, supra note 69, at 1372 (noting that limited liability
charters may have increased marketability of shares).
Other scholars have questioned to what degree unlimited liability would deter
investors. For the argument that investors buy stock in companies they believe will
succeed, not fail, thus reducing the importance of the issue of liability to the decision to invest, see Presser, supra note 25, at 159.
194 See Meiners et al., supra note 25, at 360 ("Since
bargaining in credit markets
is typically conducted in negotiated transactions, we expect that the costs of bargaining will be roughly equivalent with or without limited liability."). The authors
also note that standard form contracts could easily incorporate language limiting
liability. Id. at 364.
1'6See id. at 363 (maintaining that share price already contains "all the information, aside from undisclosed inside information, that investors need"); Presser,
supra note 25, at 159 (suggesting methods by which shareholders could monitor
cheaply).
1 6 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 101-03 (discussing insurance as
alternative to limited liability); Halpern et al., supra note 18, at 129 (observing
"similarities between an unlimited liability regime with the existence of market in-
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has been suggested that if insurance had been generally available in the nineteenth century legislatures might not have
adopted corporate limited liability at all. 6' Additionally, scholars have argued that limited liability is itself a form of insurpurchase from creditors without a
ance, one that shareholders
168
formal insurance contract.

EnterpriseLiability and the LLC
Limited liability was not always the rule.'69 It evolved in response to pressure from manufacturers in the nineteenth century.7' In addition to limited liability for corporations, the law
developed many other pro-industry doctrines in order to encourage industrial development. 7 ' The shift in tort law from strict
liability to negligence 2 and the development of the fellow servant 73 and contributory negligence 74 doctrines were other ways
surance and a limited liability regime").
'6 See Note, supra note 18, at 1196 n.27; see also Halpern et al., supra note 18,
at 125-26.
"s See, e.g., Halpern et al., supra note 18, at 126 ("limited liability Regime [is]
an implicit, creditor-provided form of insurance of the risks of business failure");
Meiners et al., supra note 25, at 361.
Of course this "insurance contract" does not take into account tort victims who
neither receive "premiums" (as contract creditors presumably do, charging more for
the services they provide than they would in an unlimited liability regime) nor compensation for their injuries.
" ' See Blumberg, supra note 15, at 587-95 (discussing emergence of limited liability in American law). See generally Dodd, supra note 69 (describing evolution of
limited liability in Massachusetts).
'" Blumberg, supra note 15, at 595; see also Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 366, 47374 (N.Y. 1822) (cited in Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1163 n.77).
171 See Gabaldon, supra note 25, at 1439 (briefly discussing emergence of caveat
emptor, negligence and other doctrines).
17 See MORTON J. HORwITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 17801860 85 (1977) (reclassification of injuries "under a 'negligence' heading ... had the
effect of substantially reducing entrepreneurial liability"); Charles 0. Gregory,
Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 382 (1951) ("[T]he
principle eliminating the unintended trespass as a substantive tort and establishing
a consistent theory of liability based on fault was developed to confer on industrial
enterprise an immunity from liability for accidental harm to others."); Cornelius J.
Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 225,
230 (1971) ("The negligence standard provided a legal environment in which rail
transportation could grow and prosper. It aided other branches of industry and
commerce as well."). But see Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth.Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981) (criticizing
Horwitz and Gregory).
1 See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS (5th ed. 1984) § 80, at 571-72 (describing
development of fellow servant doctrine, which limited vicarious liability of employers to their employees, as motivated by desire of courts "to encourage industrial un-
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the law protected nascent industry. Yet with the growth of industrial enterprises and the availability of insurance, many
manufacturer protections have eroded:175 Strict products liability
has replaced negligence;17 contributory negligence has largely
been replaced by comparative negligence;177 and the fellow servant doctrine has been abolished as a defense in workers' compensation actions.178 Perhaps limited liability should fade away,
rather than being expanded through the adoption of an attractive new business entity such as the LLC?
In the twentieth century, the idea that industry should
"assume the burden of paying for all damage ensuing from its
normal operations,"'79 has replaced the idea that industry requires a subsidy. 8 ' Enterprise liability has several objectives.
By forcing industry to internalize all of its costs, it deters overly
risky behavior.' It is also a way of spreading loss.'82 Industry
dertakings by making the burden upon them as light as possible"); see also Gregory,
supra note 172, at 368.
174 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 173, § 65, at 452 (explaining acceptance
of contributory negligence doctrine, under which a plaintiff is denied recovery if his
or her negligence contributed to harm, as result of desire of courts to "keep the liabilities of growing industry within some bounds"); Peck, supra note 172, at 231
("concept of contributory negligence as a bar to recovery rose to prominence in response to the need for a legal system compatible with the demands of a growing industrial economy").
171 See Gabaldon, supra note 25, at 1440 (noting difference in evolution of tort
and contract law on one hand, and corporate law, on other).
176 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 173, § 65, at 694
(citing Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 (1963) and acceptance of Section 402A of Second
Restatement of Torts as catalysts for "adoption of strict liability in tort throughout
the country").
177Id. §

67, at 478-479.

"8 Id. § 80, at 573. Furthermore, as the authors point out, workers' compensation acts are strict liability statutes. Id.; see also Gregory, supra note 172, at 388.
'79 Gregory, supra note 172, at 382-83; see also George L. Priest, The Invention
of EnterpriseLiability:A CriticalHistory of the Intellectual Foundationsof Modern
Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 463 (1985) ("theory of enterprise liability ...
provides in its simplest form that business enterprises ought to be responsible for
losses resulting from products they introduce into commerce").
'go
See Priest, supra note 179, at 463 ("By the mid-1950s, the theory of enterprise liability commanded almost complete support within the academic community,
and it was accepted and implemented as a tool of social policy in the early 1960s
... ). See also Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1422,
1455 (1966) ("desire to protect growing industry ...
seems outweighed by the wealth
of corporate enterprise"). For a history of the growth and acceptance of enterprise
liability, see Gregory, supra note 172. Enterprise liability is not without its critics.
See generally David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict ProductsLiability, 33
VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980).
'8'See Priest, supra note 179, at 478. This has been called the control rationale
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can insure against those losses by building into the cost of products foreseeable losses from accidents." Requiring industry to
administer this loss-shifting system is equitable since industry
profits from the risk creation."M
Since shareholders profit from corporate enterprises, it may
185
also be fair to require them to pay the costs of doing business.
Yet the deterrence rationale of enterprise liability arguably does
not support holding shareholders who do not manage the enterprise responsible for accidents.'86 Members of limited liability
companies, however, can manage the enterprise as well as receive the profits of the enterprise. Thus the policies supporting
enterprise liability would support requiring individual members
of LLCs to assume the risk of accidents.
V.

MITIGATING THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF LLCS

The thrust of this paper has been that limited liability is inadvisable for entities with the organizational characteristics of
the LLC. Because powerful interest groups support LLC legislation, however, it is unrealistic to hope for their wholesale repeal. Legislatures must therefore look for ways to mitigate the
externalization of costs associated with LLCs.
As discussed above, the passage of LLC legislation creates
incentives for firms to engage in overly risky activities without

of enterprise liability.
152 See Gregory, supra note 172, at 383 (describing enterprise liability as
"desirable 'socialization' of loss-bearing on the whole community"); Priest, supra
note 179, at 471 (describing Fleming James' distribution of risk theory).
'83 Gregory, supra note 172, at 383-84; Priest, supra note 179, at 471. A number
of scholars have pointed out that individuals are usually not in as good a position to
purchase insurance as the enterprise. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 172, at 384;
Ehrenzweig, supra note 180, at 1447.
'
See Gregory, supra note 172, at 385 (discussing workers' compensation statutes and noting "homely justice in letting [employers] undertake this burden because they are risk-creating agencies in enterprises conducted for profit"); see also
Priest, supra note 179, at 466-67 (describing Francis Bohlen's "benefit theory" of enterprise liability).
' s See Thompson, supra note 15, at 29-30 (considering proposition that shareholders should be liable for corporate torts on "economic benefits" theory).
...
Thompson, supra note 15, at 4 (arguing that "stronger case can be made to
hold ... participants liable for the acts of others as compared to situations in which
the individual is only a shareholder without control"). However, the argument could
be made that while shareholders may not manage, they do indirectly control the enterprise by electing the board of directors. Furthermore, shareholders who are not
satisfied with management decisions can sell their shares, i.e. vote with their feet.
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adequate insurance or capitalization.'8 7 Tort victims whose injuries exceed firm assets will be hurt most by this behavior. One
solution to this problem is to mandate that LLCs carry liability
insurance.'8 8 Since insurance premiums will be linked to the behavior of companies, the added costs will give companies an incentive to reduce risk.'8 9 The insurance proceeds can be used
additionally to compensate tort victims who have not agreed to
bear risks. Currently, however, no state requires all LLCs to
carry insurance.'
Mandatory insurance is superior is some ways to unlimited
liability because it is a better guarantee of payment for tort victims if LLC members are judgment proof.'
Failure to carry
such insurance should result in a court decision to "pierce the
veil" of the LLC and hold members personally liable.
Some critics charge that mandatory insurance schemes create regulatory problems and drive up the cost of doing business.9 They claim it is too difficult to set appropriate insurance
levels for vastly different businesses.'9 3 Yet states currently require employers in many of the same businesses to carry
worker's compensation and unemployment insurance. And an
increase in the cost of doing business is inevitable if firms are to
internalize costs that were previously externalized.
187 See

supra notes 142-147 and accompanying text.

189 This

has been attempted in some states. In Washington, for example, plaintiffs' lawyers lobbied unsuccessfully for mandatory insurance for LLCs. They did
succeed, however, in inserting a mandatory insurance provision for professionals
that practice in LLCs. See Eaves, supra note 87, at 202-03.
A number of authors have proposed schemes of mandatory insurance for corporations to mitigate the harmful effects of limited liability. See, e.g., Gabaldon, supra
note 25, at 1449-54; Note, supra note 18, at 1201-02. But see Halpern, supra note 18,
at 138-43 (arguing that unlimited liability is superior to insurance for closely held
companies because, for those companies, market-provided insurance may not be
available); Ribstein, supra note 1, at 446-47 (criticizing third-party insurance
schemes for increasing "the cost of insurance in relation to the expected loss").
9 See Halpern et al., supra note 18, at 145-46 (suggesting that requiring corporations to insure in order to limit their liability increases incentive for corporations
to operate safely).
190 See Eaves, supra note 87, at 202 (arguing
that adoption of amendment to
Washington LLC statute mandating insurance would have destroyed "statutory uniformity with states already providing the LLC business form"). Some states do require professionals who organize as LLCs to carry insurance. See infra note 194.
191 See Note, supra note 18, at 1201-03 (making this point in proposing mandatory insurance for close corporations).
19

Id.

1'Id.; see also Gabaldon, supra note 25, at 1449-54 (discussing and refuting this
and other criticisms of mandatory insurance schemes).
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Some states already require professional LLCs to carry insurance."" Do hazardous waste disposal companies, oil and gas
companies, and the like, really pose fewer risks to society than
professionals? Are those risks less worth insuring against?
It has been suggested that piercing the corporate veil'9 5 of
LLCs will prevent abuses by members. 95 Some statutes expressly mandate the application of the doctrine to LLCs.'97 Yet
piercing alone is an insufficient response to the potential harms
created by LLCs. Piercing is a less predictable method of compensation for tort victims than insurance, 8 because of the erratic way courts apply the doctrine 99 and, as noted above, because individual members of LLCs may themselves be judgment
proof. Piercing cannot provide a deterrent to risk creation the
way insurance can because it is applied only after the harm has
occurred. Members of LLCs cannot be deterred by a doctrine
they may not know about, and whose application is so uncertain.
CONCLUSION

In an end-run around the political process, proponents of
LLCs have succeeded in reducing the share of federal taxes paid
by businesses without public debate or Congressional vote. They
have set the stage for a dramatic increase in the number of businesses protected by a limited liability shield without offering a
coherent policy justification for that expansion. The rash of legislation is a response to lobbying by powerful interest groups
such as professionals and the oil and gas industry, and is a
symptom of "race to the bottom" corporate lawmaking.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.045(2) (1994) (mandating minimum one
million dollar liability insurance for certain professions practicing in LLC form).
"' The piercing doctrine allows courts to "disregard the separateness of the corporation and hold a shareholder responsible for the corporation's action as if it were
the shareholder's own." Thompson, supra note 26, at 1036.
''See, e.g., BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, 1 6.03[3], at 6-28 to 6-29.
See generally Fox, supra note 27.
7 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-107 (1992) (amended 1994); MINN. STAT. §
322B.303(2) (1995); see also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, 9 6.03[2], at 628.
"' See Thompson, supra note 26, at 1058 (noting that courts pierce corporate
veil only thirty percent of time when asked to do so by tort victims of corporations).
' See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 89 (noting "consensus that
the whole area of limited liability, and conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is
among the most confusing in corporate law"); Thompson, supra note 26, at 1036-37
are usually stated in broad terms that offer
("The boundaries of this exception ...
little guidance to judges or litigants

.... ").

608

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70: 575

Policies supporting limited liability in the corporate context
do not support limited liability in an entity such as an LLC
where ownership and control are united. Criticisms levied
against corporate limited liability apply even more forcefully
against such entities: LLCs will encourage business owners to
undercapitalize and underinsure, while discouraging efforts to
reduce risks.
Legislatures should not have rushed to pass LLC statutes
without more study and debate. Yet it seems unlikely that the
genie can be put back in the bottle. Thus legislatures must look
for a way to reduce the social harms that LLCs will likely cause.
Since those most harmed by LLCs will be uncompensated tort
victims, legislatures should mandate that all LLCs, not just
those operated by professionals, carry sufficient liability insurance.
Rachel Maizes

